

Privacy and Sharing of Genomic Data

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1: Sharing of Genomic Data Today

Objective: analyze human genome for diseases


Genomic Wide-Association Studies (GWAS)

Associations between genetic variations and specific traits

• Ex.: BRCA genes and risk of breast cancer

Sharing of aggregate data

- Simple client-server architectures
- Initially: no privacy problems known



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Attacks for identification of individuals in genetic DBs with aggregate data

[Homer et al., 2008]: identification in large aggregate data sets [Sankaraman et al., 2009]: upper bound on detection power [Wang et al., 2009]: identification in small data sets

Result: severe restrictions to public data sharing

Ex.: gwascentral.org

- frequency info not available
- Large data sets only available on request ("Data Sharing Statement" of GWAS Central)

Generally: restrictions on

- Sharing system architecture •
- **Queries on genomic DBes**



(e.g. HGVST307, rs2317951, Pancreatic cancer, replication st



About GWAS Central

GWAS Central provides a centralized compilation of summary level findings from genetic association studies, both large and small. We actively gather datasets from public domain projects, and encourage direct data submission from the community. See more ...



Need for more advanced sharing

Geneticians interested in more advanced sharing possibilities

Allow sharing of **larger data sets** Enable collaborative work on **rare variants / uncommon diseases**


Advanced sharing architectures

Sharing of raw data via e.g. trusted party Quicker access to data in the cloud

Use advanced sharing techniques

Support **confidentiality** and **integrity** efficiently Support for **ownership** and **traceability** properties







2. COMPOSITIONAL PRIVACY FOR GENETIC DATA

How to support such sharing scenarios?

Methods for the construction of architectures/processes/queries

- Means for **design** and **programming**
- Ensure basic **privacy guarantees**
- **Optimize** architectures/applications
- Formal verification of advanced privacy properties


How to ensure privacy properties?

Multiple privacy enhancing techniques:

- Encryption: a/symetric, homomorphic, attribute-based, ...
- **Client-side computing**: compute associations within local perimeter
- Data fragmentation
- Watermarking for ownership and traceability properties



COMPOSITIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF GENOMIC APPS



Declarative scenario definitions with privacy types

scenario : GeneticQuery [SubjectId, ZIP, Gender, DoB, Variant, TypeVar, MyTattoo] scenario = do 'SendRequest ' (TTP, [Q1]) G1 'SendRequest ' (TTP, [Q2, Q2']) G1 G1 'SendRequest' (TTP, [Q3, Q3']) TTP 'SendRequest' (LeftCloud, [Q1]) 'SendRequest' (RightCloud, [Q2, Q2']) TTP 'SendRequest' (RightCloud, [Q3, Q3']) TTP let q1 = LeftCloud 'executeRequest' [Q1]; let q2 = RightCloud 'executeRequest' [Q2,Q2']; let q3 = RightCloud 'executeRequest' [Q3,Q3']; demDatal ← LeftCloud 'SendData' (TTP, q1) ← RightCloud 'SendData' (TTP,q2) demDatar vcfFiles ← RightCloud 'SendData' (TTP,q3) let r1 = decrypt VariantWE (AESD "key2") vcfFiles; let r2 = decrypt TypeVarWE (AESD "key1") r1; let r3 =detectw VariantW (RGIG "wkey1" 1 ["seed1"] 1) r2; let vcfFiles = detectw TypeVarW (RGIG "wkey2" 2 ["seed2"] 2) r3; let plainData = defrag (defrag demDatal demDatar) vcfFiles

TTP 'ReturnResults' (G1, TTP 'Compute' plainData)

```
Wat : (a: Attribute) \rightarrow
       auto p1 : So (isRawType (snd a))} \rightarrow
      {auto p2 : So (isInEnv a env)} \rightarrow
      Privy env (watEnv a GIG env) []
- watermark detection operator
data Query :
          . . .
detectw :
     (a : Attribute) \rightarrow (info : ReadM GIG) \rightarrow
     \{ default Refl p1: (snd a) = (WATERMARK GIG t) \}
     \rightarrow Ouery \Delta \rightarrow
     {auto p2 : Elem a \Delta} \rightarrow
     Query ((replaceOn a (fst a, t) \Delta)++[MyTattoo])
                 Definition of
               watermarking
                    operator
 Verific./Optim.
      of genetic
    applications
```

for privacy/

efficiency

Algebraic theory: watermarking laws

 $decrypt_{(s,a)} \circ crypt_{(s,a)} \circ detectw_a \circ wat_a \equiv$ $detectw_a \circ decrypt_{(s,a)} \circ crypt_{(s,a)} \circ wat_a$

if $dom(p) \cap a = \emptyset$

```
detectw_a \circ \sigma_p = \sigma_p \circ detectw_a
```

 $\pi_{(variant,typeVar)}$ ° $\sigma_{((sub ject Id \in mdd) \land (position = i, position = j, ..))}$

(a) local query

detectwvariant.typeVar o decryptvariant.typeVaro

 $\pi_{(variant,typeVar)}\circ$

 $\sigma_{((subjectId \in mdd) \land (position = i, position = j, ..))}$

crypt_{variant.typeVar} owat_{variant,typeVar}

(b) distributed query

3. CHALLENGES

- How to harness/integrate other PETs (e.g., differential privacy)
- Which kind of genetic data and analyses can be safely outsourced?
- What about new analyses?

